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Abstract 
Empirical work on the underlying causes of the recent dislocations in bank-intermediated 
trade finance has been limited by the scant availability of hard data. This paper aims to 
analyse the key determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance using a novel dataset 
covering ten banking jurisdictions. It focuses on the role of global factors as well as 
country-specific characteristics in driving trade finance. Results indicate that country-
specific variables, such as growth in trade flows and funds available for domestic banks, as 
well as global financial conditions and global import growth, are important determinants of 
trade finance. These results are robust to different model specifications. Further, we do not 
find that trade finance is more sensitive to global financial conditions than other loans to 
non-bank entities. 
Keywords: bank-intermediated trade finance, trade flows, global financial crisis. 





El trabajo empírico sobre el impacto de las tensiones financieras sobre la financiación bancaria al 
comercio internacional se ha visto limitado históricamente por la falta de datos. Este trabajo 
contribuye a examinar este tema, empleando una nueva base de datos, que cubre diez 
jurisdicciones, lo que permite estudiar el papel de los factores globales y de los factores específicos 
de país. Los resultados indican que tanto las variables específicas de país —como el crecimiento de 
los flujos comerciales y la financiación disponible para los bancos nacionales— como las 
condiciones financieras globales y el crecimiento de las importaciones mundiales son factores 
relevantes. Los resultados son robustos a distintas especificaciones econométricas, que controlan 
por la potencial endogenidad de los flujos comerciales. 
Palabras clave: financiación bancaria al comercio internacional, flujos comerciales, crisis financiera 
global. 
Códigos JEL: F14, F19. 
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1 Introduction 
The market for global trade finance was generally regarded as well-functioning and liquid until 
the global financial crisis of 2008-09, and thus did not attract much attention from policy-
makers and scholars. Since the crisis, however, trade finance has experienced episodes of 
stress, particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and again in late 
2011, when several European banks were under funding pressures.1 In this context, 
understanding the drivers of trade finance becomes important for two main reasons. First, 
international trade is heavily dependent on trade finance since it involves certain forms of 
commercial risks that are elevated relative to domestic trade, such as payment risk and 
transportation risk, in addition to exchange rate risk, which is unique to this line of activity. 
These risks are often assumed by banks since importers and exporters are often unwilling to 
bear them. Indeed, estimates for the share of global trade relying on trade finance instruments 
range from 30 to 40 per cent (CGFS, 2014). Note that while the term “trade finance” includes 
both bank-intermediated trade finance, in which banks facilitate transactions between buyers 
and sellers, as well as non-bank trade finance, in which buyers and sellers extend credit to 
each other, this paper focuses on the first category only.2
Second, research has shown that shocks to banks in general and the supply of trade 
finance, in particular, affect exports and imports and have contributed to the recent drop in trade 
(Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2014; Del Prete and Federico, 2014; Ahn, 2013; Amiti and 
Weinstein, 2011; Paravisini et al., 2011). The importance of trade finance in supporting the 
functioning of global trade is also underscored by the fact that many multilateral and national 
institutions expanded their trade finance programs to facilitate exports and imports in some 
emerging-market and advanced economies following the call from leaders of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
 
3
Empirical work on the underlying causes as well as the impact of the recent 
dislocations in trade finance has grown rapidly after the global financial crisis. However, the 
evidence so far is largely based on surveys or country-specific analysis using firm-level data 
while cross-country analysis is absent due to the paucity of hard data. As a consequence, 
many of the important policy questions raised by the drop in trade finance during the global 
financial crisis remain largely unanswered: Did declines in cross-border bank-intermediated 
trade financing transmit financial shocks across borders? Or did they simply reflect the lesser 
need for trade financing due, for instance, to weaker growth in trading partners, or subdued 
domestic economic growth? In other words, did supply or demand drive bank-intermediated 
trade finance during the global financial crisis?  
 
To shed some light on these issues, this paper presents fresh evidence on the key 
determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance using a unique, newly constructed panel 
data set on trade finance. As such, this paper is the first attempt at understanding the 
                                                                            
1. Broadly speaking, the term “trade finance” refers to payment arrangements between buyers and sellers. The focus of 
this paper is on the international dimension of trade finance, i.e., financing for cross-border transactions.  
2. Estimates for the share of global trade finance relying on different financing options, including open accounts, inter-
firm trade credit, and bank-intermediated trade finance, are much higher, in the range of 80 to 90 per cent (Auboin, 
2009). However, global estimates should be treated with caution as gauging the overall size of the bank-intermediated 
trade finance market requires extrapolation from partial data, which makes these estimates imprecise. 
3. For a detailed discussion, see Asmundson et al. (2011) and CGFS (2014). The G-20 Communiqués, including the 
communiqué from the April 2009 summit, can be found at  
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html.  
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determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance for a set of countries and, thus, makes an 
important contribution to the empirical literature in this field. Our results indicate that both 
global as well as country-specific factors, such as growth in trade flows and the funding 
availability of domestic banks, are important determinants of trade finance. The results are 
robust when we instrument trade flows growth to control for its potential endogeneity.  
Overall, our findings suggest that the short-term, self-liquidating nature of trade 
finance could generate some scope for negative externalities for the global economy, 
especially if the banking sector is subject to shocks that are global in nature. These 
externalities can be amplified if a large number of banks simultaneously run down their 
liquidity pool embodied in their trade finance portfolios. We elaborate on the implications of 
the results in sections 5 and 6. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
related literature. Section 3 provides a brief description of trade finance instruments and 
summarizes the evolution of trade finance during the global financial crisis. Section 4 
describes the empirical methodology, choice of explanatory variables, and the data. Section 5 
discusses the results, and section 6 concludes.  
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2 Related literature 
Our work makes two key contributions to the empirical literature on trade finance. First, it 
provides fresh evidence on the determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance – an area 
that has been hitherto unexplored due to the lack of hard data. Previous empirical work has 
generally focused on firm-level data in a country-specific setting to analyze firms’ choice with 
regard to different payment contracts. For example, Ahn (2013) finds evidence of a 
substantial impact of bank liquidity shocks on the supply of letters of credit import 
transactions in Colombia during the 2008-09 crisis.  In a similar vein, Antras and Foley (2011) 
use detailed transaction-level data for a U.S.-based exporter to study how the choice 
between cash-in-advance and open account is affected by the characteristics of the country 
in which the importer is located.  In a more recent paper, Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr 
(2013), using U.S. banking data, find that the volume of banks’ trade finance claims differs 
substantially across destination countries, with claims being hump-shaped in country credit 
risk and increasing with the time to import of a destination market.  The authors also find that 
trade finance claims vary systematically with global conditions, expanding when aggregate 
risk is higher and funding is cheaper.  
Rather than taking these firm-specific approaches and focusing on certain instruments, 
such as letters of credit, our study takes a more comprehensive view to examine the key 
determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance as a whole and for a set of countries.4
Second, our work is also related to the strand of empirical literature focusing on the 
relationship between financial conditions, trade credit, and trade at the firm and sectoral 
levels. This literature has aimed at understanding and measuring the impact of disruptions in 
trade finance on the so-called “Great Trade Collapse.” At the firm level, Behrens, Corcos, and 
Mion (2013), Bricongne et al. (2012), and Coulibaly, Sapriza, and Zlate (2011) all find that 
financial constraints explain part of the decline in production and exports during the trade 
collapse. Using sector-level data, Chor and Manova (2012) examine how the sector 
composition of exports to the U.S. varies across countries depending on the cost of finance 
in those source countries. The authors find that tight financial conditions (i.e., higher interbank 
interest rates) led exports to fall more during the 2008-09 crisis in sectors with high external 
finance dependence or low asset tangibility. Further, they demonstrate that countries with 
tight financial conditions exported less to the United States than countries where financial 
conditions were less tight. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that, controlling 
for trade flows, trade finance depends on global financial conditions and funding availability for 
domestic banks, and accordingly can be impaired by financial shocks.  
 To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use such an approach, one that allows us to 
investigate the role of country-of-origin variables (frequently called “home variables”) in driving 
trade finance. The results, therefore, complement previous empirical work that has focused 
primarily on either bank-level information or country-of-destination information. Further, it is 
informative to analyze trade finance as a whole since it encompasses a wide range of 
instruments, and market intelligence suggests that firms can switch relatively easily from one 
instrument to another, making the distinction between instruments blurred at times.   
                                                                            
4. See Table 1.1 in the Appendix for a description of the country-specific data on trade finance used in this paper, and 
CGFS (2014) for an in-depth description of the data and a comparison with other sources of information.  
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3 Trade finance and international lending by banks 
3.1 Trade finance – instruments and dynamics during the global financial crisis 
The term “trade finance” is generally used for financial instruments that are specifically linked 
to underlying international trade transactions (exports or imports). Banks and other institutions 
typically provide trade finance for two purposes. First, it serves as a source of working capital 
for individual traders and international companies in need of liquid assets.5
Trade finance comprises a wide range of products used to reduce risks related to 
international payments between importers and exporters. One of the most common and 
standardized forms of bank-intermediated trade finance is a letter of credit (or L/C). L/Cs reduce 
payment risk by providing a framework under which a bank makes (or guarantees) the payment 
to an exporter on behalf of an importer once goods have been shipped or delivered.
 Second, trade 
finance provides credit insurance against the risks involved in international trade, such as 
currency or price fluctuations, or political risk. While we acknowledge that some trade finance 
instruments may be long-term in nature, in this paper we focus only on short-term bank-
intermediated trade finance, because it funds a much larger volume of trade and is also 
closely linked with overall bank funding conditions.  
6
With respect to the recent developments in the market for trade finance, Figure 1 
shows the drop in trade finance and trade at the peak of the global financial crisis – between 
October 2008 and January 2009. The fall in trade finance was about one-third of the 
contraction in global merchandise trade, with the largest declines witnessed in Emerging 
Europe and Central Asia. In the aftermath of the crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
together with the Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade – International Financial 
Services Association (BAFT-IFSA) undertook a survey on pricing, volumes, and drivers in 
trade finance markets in March 2009.
  Banks 
may also help meet working capital needs by providing trade finance loans to exporters or 
importers, i.e., short-term loans used to buy the inputs necessary to produce goods ordered by 
foreign customers. In this case, the loan documentation is linked either to an L/C or to other 
forms of documentation related to the underlying trade transaction. Working capital is more 
important for financing export shipments than for domestic shipments because of the longer lag 
between production and payment for exports (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011).  
7 This was followed by several additional survey rounds. 
The results of these surveys showed that changes in trade finance conditions were 
particularly pronounced among large banks that suffered most from the crisis and were thus 
in greater need to deleverage quickly. Further, the surveys showed that banks also increased 
the cost to borrowers. Regarding the underlying causes for the decline in trade finance, the 
surveyed banks identified the fall in demand for trade as the major reason for the decline in 
trade finance, and attributed about 30 per cent of the fall to reduced credit availability at either 
their own institutions or counterparty banks.8
                                                                            
5. A working capital loan not specifically tied to trade is typically not included in this definition. 
 While these surveys provide valuable insights 
into the developments in the market for trade finance, quantitative estimates derived from 
them should be treated with caution, as survey respondents usually provide only directional 
6. For the most part, L/Cs represent off-balance-sheet commitments, though they may, at times, be associated with an 
extension of credit. This can occur, for example, if an import L/C is structured to allow the importer a period of time 
(known as “usance”) before repaying the bank for the payment it made on the importer’s behalf. 
7. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) (2009): IMF-BAFT trade finance 
survey. “A Survey Among Banks Assessing the Current Trade Finance Environment.” 
8. Asmundson et al. (2011) provides a summary of the first four IMF surveys. 
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indications instead of details for their firm which can then be aggregated (CGFS, 2014). In 
contrast, by using objective data, this paper provides a more nuanced perspective on the 
underlying determinants of trade finance. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Empirical framework 
Our research question is closely related to the growing literature on the determinants of 
cross-border bank flows, such as Bruno and Shin (2014), Avdjiev, Kuti, and Takáts (2012), 
Hermann and Mihaljek (2010), and Takáts (2010), which suggests that such flows are driven 
both by global factors and local (i.e., country-specific) factors. Since bank-intermediated trade 
finance is a subset of total cross-border bank flows, our empirical specification and choice of 
explanatory variables are also guided by the above literature. Specifically, following Bruno and 
Shin (2014) and Avdjiev, Kuti, and Takáts (2012) our benchmark specification in its general 
form is given by: 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑌𝑙,𝑡𝑙 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜑𝑦 + 𝛾𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                           (1) 
where  ∆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 denotes the growth in the outstanding volume of bank-intermediated trade 
finance for country 𝑖, 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 are 𝑘 country-specific exogenous variables, and 𝑌𝑙,𝑡 denotes l 
global variables. The benchmark measure of the dependent variable is the quarter-over-
quarter (qoq) rate of growth of trade finance, calculated as the difference between log 
(tradefinance)t and log(tradefinance)t-1.9
In what follows, we describe our selection of the global and country-specific 
explanatory variables in detail. With regard to global factors, Bruno and Shin (2014) argue that 
global financial conditions are the key drivers of cross-border bank flows – and, accordingly, 
we expect them to be drivers of bank-intermediated trade finance.  We include three different 
measures as proxies for global financial conditions. First, we use the VIX index of implied 
volatility of S&P 500 equity index options – which is the most widely used measure of global 
financial conditions in the literature. Second, we use a synthetic indicator of financial stress, 
namely, the financial conditions index (FCI), which is based on the methodology of Guichard, 
Haugh, and Turner (2009). The FCI is derived from real short-term interest rates, real long-
term interest rates, the real effective exchange rate, bond spreads, stock market 
capitalization, and credit standards in the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
 We do not rule out the existence of time-invariant, 
country-specific factors that can stem from either the way trade finance is measured in each 
country, or from any additional country-level effects not captured by our control variables. 
Thus, we include country-specific dummies, 𝛼𝑖, in our model. We also acknowledge the 
possible existence of year-specific and quarter-specific factors, which are captured by the 
time dummies 𝜑𝑦 and 𝛾𝑞, respectively. Table 1.2 provides further details on all the variables 
included in the analysis. 
10
Finally, since trade finance is predominantly denominated in U.S. dollars – even more 
so than global trade – the ability of banks to provide trade finance can be disrupted if banks’ 
dollar funding lines are curtailed (CGFS, 2014).
 As such, it is a more comprehensive measure of global financial conditions 




                                                                            
9. An alternative would be to define trade finance relative to trade flows. Instead, we include trade flows as an 
explanatory variable in the benchmark estimations. 
 Indeed, this seems to have been the case in 
10. For details on the construction of this variable, see Guichard, Haugh, and Turner (2009). 
11. More than 80 per cent of L/Cs are settled in U.S. dollars. 
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some instances in 2008-09 and in 2011-12.12 We account for dollar funding pressures in our 
framework in the form of a proxy based on the difference between the cost of three-month 
dollar funding in foreign markets and the three-month dollar LIBOR.13 We expect this variable 
to have a negative impact on bank-intermediated trade finance. Trade finance may also be 
affected by other global variables such as world demand, which we proxy here by global 
imports growth.14
Trade finance is also likely to depend on country-specific macroeconomic 
fundamentals or “pull” factors. We include nominal GDP growth since faster-growing 
economies are likely to have greater demand for credit (Bruno and Shin, 2014).
  
15
Trade finance may also be facilitated by country-specific financial factors such as the 
leverage, equity, and funding costs of local banks, although the lack of good-quality data acts 
as a constraint in testing these hypotheses. As a proxy for local banks’ soundness, again 
following Bruno and Shin (2014), we use the banks’ capital-to-assets ratio. We expect this 
measure to be positively correlated with bank-intermediated trade finance growth. Following 
the recent literature, we also include the five-year credit default swap (CDS) spreads for each 
banking sector as a measure of banks’ riskiness and short-term funding costs in wholesale 
markets (for example, Chui et al., 2010). We construct this measure as a simple average of 
the CDS spreads for the main banks in each country (see Table 1.3). Finally, we also include 
the (country-specific) growth in trade flows (defined as the sum of exports and imports), which 
is expected to be an important determinant of trade finance.  
 Following 
recent literature on the links between private and sovereign debt, we include the S&P rating 
as a measure of sovereign creditworthiness. Sovereign defaults are frequently accompanied 
by domestic banking crises, usually due to the fact that the government postpones the 
default decision and strains the banking system in order to service the debt, until it is no 
longer feasible (Arteta and Hale, 2008). This would make domestic liquidity more scarce, 
which in turn would put upward pressure on the cost of trade finance, since banks set rates 
that account for the higher probabilities of defaults by importers and exporters.  
Estimating equation (1) poses some challenges. First, there is potential endogeneity 
arising from the inclusion of growth in trade flows as an explanatory variable. Second, global 
factors are likely to be important determinants of trade finance, which in turn can be a source 
of large cross-sectional correlation. Indeed, inference can be misleading if the standard errors 
are not robust to such cross-sectional correlation. A final issue is the size of the panel. Our 
data set contains 10 countries (N), and an average of 30 quarters (T). In panels with large T, 
the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant and such models can be estimated with more 
straightforward fixed effects estimators (Roodman, 2006). 
Taking these issues into account, we estimate the benchmark model based on the 
fixed effects estimation with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, which renders errors robust to 
cross-sectional correlation (Driscoll and Kraay (1998); Hoechle (2007)). As mentioned above, 
we also include the time (i.e., year) dummies in order to control for any additional time-specific 
                                                                            
12. For instance, reduced dollar funding in the aftermath of the Lehman failure was one of the main reasons for the 
Brazilian and Korean central banks to provide both direct and indirect support to trade finance markets (CGFS, 2014). 
13. The foreign currencies included are the Canadian dollar, euro, Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar, Japanese yen, 
Korean won, Swiss franc, and the pound sterling. The overall dollar funding pressure is obtained as the unweighted 
average across all these currencies. The source of this variable is the Federal Reserve Board. 
14. Another alternative is to use global real GDP growth, but we consider global imports growth to be a better proxy for 
global demand conditions.  
15. There is also evidence that foreign bank lending to emerging markets is procyclical (see Jeanneau and Micu, 2002). 
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sources of cross-sectional correlation. However, this estimation procedure does not eliminate 
the biases stemming from the potentially endogenous variable, namely, trade flows growth. 
Therefore, as a robustness check, we also estimate equation (1) using instrumental variables 
(IV) to correct account for the potential endogeneity of trade flows growth. The IVs should be 
such that they do not directly determine 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 but are correlated with the variable being 
instrumented. We consider two potential instruments capturing a country’s external demand. 
To construct these variables, we first identify the ten main trading partners for each country in 
our sample and compute the share of exports to each of these countries in total exports of 
the particular country. Next, we compute two trade-weighted aggregates and test their 
validity as instruments. The first variable is the trade-weighted measure of real GDP growth for 
each country’s top ten trading partners.  The second instrumental variable is a similar trade-
weighted measure of growth in exports to the main trading partners for each country. Both 
variables are potentially valid instruments as we expect them to be highly correlated with a  
trade flows growth but uncorrelated with the error term.16
A final issue with regard to estimating equation (1) is the correlation between the 
global variables which turs out to be quite strong (Table 1). Thus, we include these variables 
on an individual basis in the regression analysis. We also perform panel unit root tests (Fisher-
type tests) to check for non-stationarity in certain variables (trade finance growth, GDP growth 
and banks’ capital-to-assets ratio) and do not find any evidence of unit roots.  
 We then estimate equation (1) using 
the within 2SLS estimator. 
 
4.2 Data  
The data on trade finance used in this paper were put together by members of the Study 
Group on Trade Finance under the auspices of the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS).17
Table 1.1 provides a detailed description of the country-specific data on trade 
finance. Data coverage in terms of trade finance instruments differs substantially across 
countries. While countries like Brazil, India, Italy, and Korea have detailed data covering a 
significant share of overall trade finance activities in their countries, others have statistics 
capturing only specific components of their trade finance markets, such as export-related 
trade finance or letters of credit (L/Cs). For most countries, the available data capture only on-
balance-sheet lending activities (i.e., L/Cs are excluded, except when they are tied to or 
 The sample includes the following 10 countries: Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample spans the 
time period 2001Q1 to 2012Q4, although the trade finance data are not available for the full 
time period for some countries, resulting in an unbalanced panel.  
                                                                            
16. We also consider three competitiveness indicators from the OECD as potential instruments: relative unit labour 
costs, relative consumer prices, and relative price of exported goods. However, these indicators fail to pass the test of 
validity of instruments. 
17. The final report of the Study Group (CGFS, 2014) can be found at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs50.htm. 
Table 1: Matrix of correlations between global variables
Financial conditions 
index (FCI)




Financial conditions index (FCI) 1
VIX 0.93 1
World imports growth (qoq) -0.65 -0.57 1
Dollar funding pressure 0.8 0.77 -0.59 1
Note: The correlations between the financial variables are generally lower once we exclude the peak crisis periods, 
i.e., 2008Q4 and 2009Q1.
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become funded loans) by resident banks and focus on lending to domestic borrowers. 
Admittedly, the focus on domestic lending makes it difficult to track global activities of banks 
in these countries. On the other hand, statistics for countries like Germany and the United 
States mainly cover cross-border activity, particularly so to emerging-market economies 
(EMEs), which makes it difficult to track the domestic activities of banks in these countries. 
Thus, each national data source should be viewed as providing a partial window into aspects 
of the bank-intermediated trade finance activities conducted in that country (CGFS, 2014). As 
mentioned earlier, we include country-specific fixed effects in equation (1) to account for the 
differences in the way in which trade finance is measured across countries but not every 
potential source of heterogeneity can be controlled for. Yet we believe that our estimates 
mark an improvement over existing research, which has focused either on firm-specific data 
or on specific instruments, while our data set provides a more comprehensive coverage of 
trade finance within each country. 
A few recent trends in the data are worth highlighting. Globally bank-intermediated 
trade finance has increased substantially in dollar terms over the past decade, particularly 
since the end of 2006. The pace, however, has diverged significantly across countries in 
recent years (Figure 2). The growth in trade finance is particularly notable in some of the 
emerging-market countries in our sample, which in turn corroborates anecdotal evidence that 
local banks in these countries are playing a greater role in the provision of trade finance 
(CGFS, 2014). 
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5 Results  
5.1 Benchmark specification 
Table 2 shows the benchmark regressions with the quarter-over-quarter growth in outstanding 
trade finance volumes as the dependent variable. As discussed, all regressions are estimated using 
fixed effects estimation with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Column (1) includes world imports 
growth as an explanatory variable, while columns (2) through (4) include our three measures of 
global financial conditions individually. Results show that growth in bank-intermediated trade 
finance is positively associated with trade flows growth, as expected.18 The CDS spread also has 
the expected sign and is statistically significant. An increase in CDS spreads of 100 basis points is 
associated with a reduction in trade finance of roughly 1.3 percentage points on a quarter-over-
quarter basis.19
 
 The capital-to-assets ratio of banks, however, does not have a statistically 
significant impact on trade finance. Growth in world imports is associated with stronger trade 
finance growth, as expected, and the effect is highly statistically significant. 
International financial strains are found to impair trade finance, as exemplified by the 
negative and highly significant relationship between the VIX, the financial conditions index (FCI), 
and dollar funding pressures (columns (2) – (4)). Specifically, a 100-basis-point increase in the 
FCI translates into a roughly 7-percentage-point drop in trade finance, while a similar increase in 
dollar funding costs is associated with a roughly 4-percentage-point decrease in the growth of 
                                                                            
18. We also included other country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals, such as inflation, budget balance/GDP, and 
external debt/GDP in the benchmark specification, but the coefficients on these variables were generally not significant. 
Hence, we do not include them in the benchmark regressions reported here. 
19. This is the average impact across the four specifications in Table 3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade flows growth 0.123* 0.201*** 0.195*** 0.229***
[0.070] [0.056] [0.071] [0.049]
Bank capital to total assets 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
CDS spreads -0.011** -0.013** -0.012** -0.016**
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007]
S&P rating 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.003
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
GDP growth -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]




Financial conditions index -0.068***
[0.022]
Dollar funding pressures -0.040***
[0.014]
Observations 294 294 294 294
Within R-squared 0.3 0.27 0.26 0.26
Table 2: Determinants of growth in trade finance: FE estimations with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The dependent variable is 
the quarter-over-quarter (qoq) growth in the outstanding volume of trade finance. All explanatory variables in 
growth rates are also in terms of qoq growth. All specifications include year and quarter dummies and 
country-specific fixed effects and are estimated using the fixed effects estimation with Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors.
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trade finance. These sizable impacts illustrate well the important role played by global financial 
conditions in determining trade finance flows. These results are also in line with Takáts (2010), 
who finds that the VIX can explain a substantial part of the variation in cross-border bank 
lending, especially during the post-Lehman episode.  All in all, the results suggest that trade 
finance growth depends on global financial conditions, global imports growth, as well as 
country-specific trade flows growth and funding availability for domestic banks. 
5.2 Robustness check – IV estimation   
We re-estimate the regressions in Table 2 using instrumental variables. To instrument trade 
flows growth, we use the two valid instruments identified: the trade-weighted measure of the 
main trade partners’ trade-flows growth; and the trade-weighted measure of the main partners’ 
real GDP growth. The results are reported in Table 3. The Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentification confirms that the instruments are valid. The IV estimation results are broadly in 
line with the benchmark results. Trade flows growth has a positive impact on the growth of 
bank-intermediated trade finance. This effect is not statistically significant in the first column, 
perhaps due to the high correlation between the instruments and one of the other independent 
variables – the worlds import growth.  Global financial strains have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on trade finance growth. Higher world imports growth is positively associated 
with trade finance growth. The coefficient for CDS spreads is only significant in one specification 
(column 4). A potential explanation for this could be that the impact of the country-specific 
variables is not properly identified by the instrumental variable approach given the cross-
sectional correlation that could arise from the presence of the global financial variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade flows growth 0.168 0.268** 0.262** 0.296***
[0.109] [0.105] [0.107] [0.099]
Bank capital to total assets 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
CDS spreads -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
S&P rating 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002
[0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
GDP growth -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]




Financial Conditions Index -0.061***
[0.021]
Dollar funding pressures -0.037***
[0.012]
R-squared 0.268 0.244 0.237 0.248
Observations 294 294 294 294
Sargan-Hansen statistic 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.25
p-value 1 1 1 1
Note: All models include country-fixed effects, year dummies and quarterly dummies. Standard errors in
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Trade flows growth is instrumented with two instruments: the trade-
weighted real growth of the top ten trading partners for each country; and the weighted trade flows growth of
the top ten trading partners for each country. We assess the validity of instruments using the Sargan-Hansen
test of the validity of instruments. The null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated
with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation). Thus, if the test does not reject the null
hypothesis, there is evidence in favor of the validity of the instruments used. 
Table 3: Determinants of growth in trade finance: Instrumental variables approach
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5.3 Additional analysis: Advanced economies versus EMEs  
We investigate whether EMEs and advanced economies are impacted differently by some 
global variables.20
The results are reported in Table 4 and are very similar to the benchmark 
specification (Table 2). Global factors are important in explaining bank-intermediated trade 
finance in both EMEs and advanced economies; they do not have any additional impact on 
emerging economies.  
 To do so, we create a dummy variable called “EMEs”, which takes a value 
of 1 if a country is classified as an emerging market economy and 0 otherwise. We then 
interact these variables with each of the four global variables and include the resulting (four) 
explanatory variables in the regression framework. The coefficient on each variable indicates 
whether global variables have any differential impact on emerging economies, compared with 
the benchmark effect.  
 
                                                                            
20. Advanced economies include: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
EMEs include Brazil, India, and Korea.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade flows growth 0.126* 0.204*** 0.199** 0.227***
[0.064] [0.054] [0.068] [0.050]
Bank capital to total assets 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
CDS spreads -0.018** -0.017** -0.015* -0.020**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
S&P rating -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
GDP growth -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
World imports growth 0.010***
[0.001]






Financial Conditions Index -0.068***
[0.020]
EMES*Financial Conditions Index 0.012
[0.020]
Dollar funding pressures -0.041**
[0.013]
EMES*Dollar funding pressures 0.014
[0.012]
Observations 294 294 294 294
Within R-squared 0.309 0.266 0.265 0.266
Note: All models include country-fixed effect, year dummies, and quarterly dummies. Driscoll-Kraays 
standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 4: Effects of global variables on emerging economies: FE estimation with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1524 
We also estimate the model using the instrumental variables approach as in section 
5.1 above. The results are reported in table 5 and are largely in with those obtained from 
using the fixed effects estimation using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Table 4). The impact of 
global variables is not significantly different for emerging economies compared to the 
benchmark effect. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade flows growth 0.172 0.273*** 0.269** 0.296***
[0.109] [0.106] [0.109] [0.099]
Bank capital to total assets 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
CDS spreads -0.018* -0.016 -0.015 -0.019*
[0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010]
S&P rating -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008
[0.011] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013]
GDP growth -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
World imports growth 0.009***
[0.002]






Financial Conditions Index -0.062***
[0.021]
EMES*Financial Conditions Index 0.015
[0.026]
Dollar funding pressures -0.038***
[0.012]
EMES*Dollar funding pressures 0.013
[0.015]
R-squared 0.281 0.222 0.243 0.225
Observations 294 294 294 294
Sargan-Hansen statistic 0 0.1 0 0.2
p-value 1 1 1 1
Note: All models include country-fixed effect, year dummies, and quarterly dummies. Standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models are estimated with instrumental variables. In these especifications, trade 
flows growth is instrumented with two instruments: the real growth of the Top 10 trade partners; and  the trade 
flows growth ot the Top 10 trade partners. Other instruments employed in previous specifications (OECD 
competitiveness indicators) fail to be valid instruments. Test of overidentifying restrictions: test of the null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments.
Table 5. Effects of global variables on emerging economies: Instrumental variables 
h
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6 Conclusion 
Understanding the drivers of trade finance is important from both an academic as well as 
policy-makers’ standpoint, since 30 to 40 per cent of global trade relies on some version of 
trade finance. The sharp drop in trade finance during the global financial crisis has raised 
some important policy questions. However, empirical work on the determinants of trade 
finance has been very limited due to the lack of availability of data, with previous studies 
having focused on developments in specific countries. Our paper addresses this gap by 
analyzing the main determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance using a newly 
constructed data set in a panel estimation framework. 
Results indicate that bank-intermediated trade finance is impaired by global financial 
strains, while it depends positively on global imports growth. Country-specific variables, 
namely, growth in trade flows, and the funding availability of domestic banks – as measured 
by the banks’ CDS spreads – are also important determinants of trade finance. These results 
are robust to different model specifications.  
We acknowledge that there are other potentially relevant drivers of bank-
intermediated trade finance that have not been included in our analysis. These include 
measures of contractual enforcement, bank lending restrictions, and foreign exchange 
restrictions, as well as additional country-specific measures of banking system soundness. 
However, including these indicators in an econometric framework is challenging given the lack 
of good-quality data. Further, policy responses to mitigate the impact of global financial 
conditions probably played an important role in determining trade-finance developments. 
However, given the small sample size and the significant heterogeneity in policy responses 
across countries, we leave these questions to be addressed in future research. 
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Country Data description Source
1. Australia Stock of banks’ contingent liabilities arising from
trade-related obligations (e.g., documentary L/Cs
issued, acceptances on trade bills or shipping
guarantees issued).
Reserve Bank of Australia
2. Brazil Stock and flows of resident banks’ trade finance vis-
à-vis residents for exports and imports.
Central Bank of Brazil
3. France Stock of trade finance, including both buyer and




5. India Stock of short-term loans and advances of pre- and
post-shipment bank-intermediated export credit, as
well as stock and flows of import credit extended by
banks with maturities of less than three years.
Reserve Bank of India
Italian credit register
(not public)
7. Korea Stock of documentary bills, domestic import usance
bills, and pre-shipment finance.
Bank of Korea, Financial
Supervisory Service
8. Spain Stock of commercial credit to non-residents and
documentary credit to residents and non-residents,
granted by banks operating in Spain.
Bank of Spain (not public)
9. United Kingdom Estimates derived from reported amounts for
“lending under Export Credit Guarantee Department
bank guarantee” and “holdings of non-resident bills,”
which may be discounted for trade finance purposes.





*FFIEC stands for the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
Table 1.1: Trade finance data
4. Germany Estimations for the volume of short-term trade
finance to emerging and developing countries,
covering maturities of 12 months or less. 
6. Italy Stock of loans and guarantees for import and export
purposes by domestic banks.
10. United States Stock of bank-intermediated, short-term trade
finance (including funded loans and unfunded off-
balance-sheet commitments and guarantees) vis-à-
vis foreign residents on an ultimate risk basis.










Nominal GDP growth National Statistical 
Agencies via Haver 
Quarter-over-quarter (annualized rate) growth in
percentage points; seasonally adjusted.
S&P rating Standard & Poor’s We transform ratings into numerical values, using a
linear mapping. AAA corresponds to “20,” while D
corresponds to “0.” The threshold between investment
grade and junk is 12.
Banks’ capital-to-assets
ratio
WDI (annual data –
interpolated)
In percentage points
CDS spreads Datastream Five-year CDS spreads, in percentage points,
measured as the average of the CDS spreads for the





Qoq growth in “external loans in all currencies vis-à-vis
the non-bank sector,” in basis points; calculated as log
differences
Global variables






Constructed following Guichard, Haugh, and Turner
(2009). The index covers four economic areas: the
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the
euro area. In each country/region, the index aggregates
information on credit conditions, bond spreads, real
and short-term interest rates, and real effective
exchange rates. 
Imports growth World Bank, World
Development Indicators 
Qoq growth in percentage points; calculated as log
differences.
Dollar funding pressures Federal Reserve staff
calculations
Difference between the cost of three-month dollar
funding in foreign markets and the three-month U.S.
dollar LIBOR. The foreign currencies included are the
Canadian dollar, euro, Hong Kong dollar, Singapore
dollar, Japanese yen, Korean won, Swiss franc, and the 
pound sterling. The overall dollar funding pressure is
the unweighted average across all these currencies,





Statistics (DOTs) data via
Haver 
Trade-weighted growth (quarter-over-quarter) in
exports to top export destinations. The weights used
are the share of exports to each destination country in





Statistics (DOTs) data via
Haver ; National
Statistical Agencies via
Trade-weighted real GDP growth (quarter-over-
quarter). The weights used are the share of exports to
each destination country in total world exports of the
source country ( in percentage points)
Trade flows growth (sum
of exports and imports) CGFS (2014)
Qoq growth in basis points; calculated as log
differences
Table 1.2: Description of variables






1. Australia National Australia Bank
2. Brazil Banco do Brasil, Bradesco, Votorantim
3. France BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Société Générale
4. Germany Deutshe Bank AG, Commerzbank AG
5. India ICICI Bank, State Bank of India
6. Italy Intesa Sanpaolo, Unicredito Italiano
7. Korea Hana Bank, Woori Bank, Kookmin Bank
8. Spain Banco Santander, BBVA
9. United Kingdom
Barclays Bank, Lloyds Bank, RBS Group PLC, HSBC Bank PLC
10. United States Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo
Table 1.3: List of banks included in CDS spreads (5 years) measure
Note: For Brazil, we use as the sovereign CDS spreads for the period prior to 2011 as a proxy 
since the information on banks’ CDS spreads is only available from 2011.
Source: Datastream
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